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Abstract—In this paper, the privacy of two recent RFID tag
ownership transfer protocols are investigated against the tag
owners as adversaries.
The first protocol called ROTIV is a scheme which provides a
privacy-preserving ownership transfer by using an HMAC-based
authentication with public key encryption. However, our passive
attack on this protocol shows that any legitimate owner which
has been the owner of a specific tag is able to trace it either in
the past or in the future. Tracing the tag is also possible via an
active attack for any adversary who is able to tamper the tag
and extract its information.
The second protocol called, Chen et al.’s protocol, is an ownership
transfer protocol for passive RFID tags which conforms EPC
Class1 Generation2 standard. Our attack on this protocol shows
that the previous owners of a particular tag are able to trace it
in future. Furthermore, they are able even to obtain the tag’s
secret information at any time in the future which makes them
capable of impersonating the tag.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification(RFID) is currently consid-
ered as the next generation technology that mainly used
to identify massive objects in an automated way and will
substitute traditional optical barcode system in near future.
The RFID advantages such as reducing supply chain ineffi-
ciencies and improving inventory flow leaves no doubt that the
dominant deployment of barcodes nowadays in supply chain
will be promptly taken over by RFID tags. But it has its own
drawbacks too.
As products flow through a supply chain, their ownership
is transferred from one partner to the next. This transfer of
ownership extends to the RFID tags attached to these products.
Thus all information associated with the tag will need to be
passed from the current to the new owner. However, at the
moment of tag ownership transfer, both the current and new
owners have the information necessary to authenticate a tag,
and this fact may cause an infringement of tag owner privacy
[5].
To handle this problem, tag ownership transfer protocols are
proposed to transfer the ownership of a tag from one owner to
another securely. The proposed schemes for ownership transfer
protocols are divided into two groups. Some schemes exploit
a trusted third party(TTP) which acts as a secure channel to
transfer some information between the entities. One of the first
solution of this kind was proposed by Saito et al.[6]. However,
the security of their scheme is only based on the short read
range of the backward channel (tag to reader communication)
by assuming that it is hard for adversaries to eavesdrop on this
channel. Another scheme with TTP is proposed by Molnar
et al. [7]. They exploit the TTP to manage tag keys by
a tree structure. But in this protocol one key is shared by
several tags which makes this protocol vulnerable. The privacy
of the whole system decreases quickly when more tags are
compromised [8].
There also exist some decentralized proposals without a using
TTP. Most of these schemes have two following assumptions:
there is a secure channel between the current and new owner to
pass the tag’s information securely. They also assume that the
new owner and the tag will be able to execute an authentication
session in an isolated environment without presence of the
current owner after the ownership transfer is completed in
order to update some secret parameters.
For instance, Soppera and Burbridge [9] adopt the scheme
of Molnar et al. by replacing the TTP with some distributed
local devices called RFID acceptor tag. In [13], the authors
have also proposed a decentralized protocol relying on the
assumption that owners are able to change the tag key in
an isolated environment. However, this protocol has security
vulnerabilities well described in [14]. Song et al. [11] proposed
a scheme with introduction of a new property called autho-
rization recovery which facilitates the ownership transfer of a
tag to its previous owner. But Pedro et al. [12] showed that
their schemes has some vulnerabilities as well.
Recently, two other tag ownership transfer protocols have
been proposed. The first scheme is called an RFID ownership
transfer with issuer verification (ROTIV) [16] which provides
a constant-time, privacy-preserving tag ownership transfer.
The ROTIV’s main idea is to combine an HMAC-based
authentication with public key encryption. The second scheme
which is proposed by Chen et al. [17], proposes an RFID
ownership transfer systems which conforms the requirements
of EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 Standard.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate the privacy
of two aforementioned ownership transfer protocols. The in-
vestigation includes some attacks to violate the forward and
backward privacy as well as previous and new owner privacy
properties of the schemes.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the privacy issues and properties required
for tag ownership transfer protocols as well as system and
adversary modelings. In Sections III and IV the description
of the the ROTIV and Chen et al. protocols and our attack
on them are presented respectively, and finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To lend clarity to our discussions in the subsequent sections,
in this section, we outline the models and properties used in
ownership transfer protocol.
A. System Model
In ownership transfer protocols, there are mainly three active
entities involved: current owner, tag and new owner. The
owners in an ownership transfer protocols are some readers
in practice which take the role of ownership in these kinds of
protocols. The ownership transfer protocols typically provide
a solution to transfer the tag’s information from the current
owner to the new owner.
Most of the ownership transfer protocols consist of two phases,
an authentication phase and a ownership transfer phase.
By the former phase, the tag and two owners are mutually
authenticated and the latter phase assures all three entities
that the ownership of the tag is transferred in a proper and
privacy-preserving way.
B. Privacy Properties
Generic privacy properties and how to formalize them for
RFID systems have been extensively explored in the literature
[1], [2], [3], [4]. The two generic privacy property we address
in this paper are:
• Backward Privacy: an adversary should not be able to to
trace past transactions between an owner and a tag, even
if it compromises/tamper the tag.
• Forward Privacy: an adversary should not be able to to
trace future transactions between an owner and a tag, even
if it compromises/tamper the tag.
On the other hand, in tag ownership transfer protocols changes
of tag owner could occur frequently and at the moment of tag
ownership transfer, both the current and new owners have the
information necessary to authenticate a tag, and this fact may
cause an infringement of tag owner privacy. Therefore, there
are two extra privacy issues dedicated for ownership transfer
protocols in the literature [10], [15]:
• New owner privacy: Once ownership of a tag has been
transferred to a new owner, only the new owner should be
able to identify and control the tag. The previous owner
of the tag should no longer be able to identify or trace
the tag.
• Current/previous owner privacy: When ownership of a
tag has been transferred to a new owner, the new owner of
a tag should not be able to trace past interactions between
the tag and its previous owner.
C. Adversary Model
In [3], Juels and Weis give a formal model of the privacy in
RFID systems. In this model, tags (T ) and readers/owners (R)
interact in protocol sessions. During this interaction there is
also an adversary entity A which passively or actively interacts
with them. The adversary may have access to an oracle which
can be queried by the following queries:
• Execute(T ,R, i): This query is responded by the in-
formation of T and R interactions in an honest protocol
session at time instance i.
• Send(P1,P2, i,m): This query models active attacks by
allowing the adversary A to impersonate some entity, a
tag or a reader, P1 in some protocol session i and send
a message m of its choice to an instance of some other
entity P2.
• Corrupt(T ): This query allows the adversary A to
tamper the tag to learn the stored secret information of
the tag T
• Test(i, T0, T1): This query is responded by a random bit
b ∈ {0, 1} and the interaction information of the tag T0
and T1 with the reader/owner at ith time instance.
D. Attack Scenario
In [3], the adversary A aims at tracing a specific target tag
T . To do so, she,
• absorbs the information she requires about the target tag
T by the means of queries previously described.
• choose two test tags T0 and T1 where one of them is T ,
and asks the oracle for the challenge by Test query. The
response will be the interactions between the T0 and T1
tags with the reader R at a specific time instance.
The adversary succeeds to violate the privacy of the tag by
tracing it, if she is able to distinguish the tag T between the
two tested tags by outputting 0 or 1.
E. Notations
Here, we explain the notations used hereafter.
• Ek(.): Symetric/asymetric encryption function operation
with the key k.
• pkX , skX : Public and private key of entity X respec-
tively.
• hk(.): Keyed hash function with key k.
• h(.): Hash functions.
• PRNG(.): Pseudo random number generator.
• T,On, On+1: Tag, current owner and new owner.
• IDX : The identification (ID) of entity X .
• NX : Random numbers generated by entity X .
• mi: dynamic value m at time instance i.
III. ROTIV PROTOCOL
ROTIV is a decentralized scheme which does not require
a trusted third party to perform tag ownership transfer. This
protocol provides issuer verification that allows prospective
owners to check the identity of the entity which has issued the
tag. The authors have claimed that their scheme ensures both
forward and backward privacy and it also preserves current
and new owner privacy.
There are four entities involved in the protocol, a tag T , current
owner On, new owner On+1 and issuer I which initializes the
tag and owners.
In ROTIV, the T stores a symmetric key k, a state parameter
s, where k is a key shared between the tag and its owner and
s is an Elgamal encryption of T ’s identification information.
A. Preliminaries
Bilinear pairing
Let G1, G2 and GT be groups, such that G1 and G2 have the
same prime order q. Pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear
pairing if has the following properties:
1) bilinear: ∀a, b ∈ Zq , g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 ,
e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab
.
2) computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute
e(g1, g2) for any (g1, g2) ∈ G1 ×G2;
3) non-degenerate: if g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a
generator of G2, then e(g1, g2) is a generator GT .
B. Description
Setup: The issuer I outputs (q,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e),
where G1, GT are subgroups of prime order q, g1 and
g2 are random generators of G1 and G2 respectively, and
e : G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear pairing.
The issuer chooses x ∈ Z∗q and computes the pair (gx1 , gx2 ).
The I’s public and secret keys are:
skI = (x, g
x
1 ), pkI = g
x
2 (1)
I randomly selects αn ∈ Z∗q and provides each owner On with
a secret key skOn = αn and a public key pkOn = (g
α2
n
1 , g
αn
2 ).
All owners know each others public keys.
Tag Initialization: The issuer I picks a random number
t ∈ Fq, where Fq is the finite field with q elements. Using
a cryptographic hash function h : Fq → G1, I computes
u0 = 1 and v0 = hx(t). Finally, I chooses randomly a key
k0 ∈ Fq and stores: (k0, s0), where s0 = (u0, v0) into the
tag. I also provides On with T ’s information refOn . This
information includes two dynamic values kold, knew which
are updated after each successful transaction and two static
values δ = t, ψ = hx(t) which represent the identification of
the issuer of the tag.
refOn = (kold, knew , δ, ψ) = (k0, k0, t, h
x(t)) (2)
Before accepting the tag, the owner can read the tag and checks
the authenticity of the static values of the tag:
e(h(δ), pkI) = e(ψ, g2) (3)
Ownership Transfer: The ROTIV ownership transfer pro-
tocol (Fig.1) is a combination of two mutual authentication
sessions between the tag and current and new owners with the
ownership transfer protocol between the current owner On and
the new owner On+1.
In ith time instance of the ROTIV protocol:
1. New owner On+1 generates a random nonce NOn+1 and
sends it to the tag and the current owner simultaneously.
2. The tag T also generates a random number NT and
send it with its status parameter si = (ui, vi) and a hash
mi = hki(NOn+1 , NT , si) to the new owner.
3. On+1 selects a random number rv and computes Av = urvi .
Then, it sends NOn+1 , NT , si,mi and Av to the current owner
On. In this way, On is able to authenticate the tag by
computing,
ψ =
vi
(ui)α
2
n
(4)
Then, it searches in the database to see if ψ is in the database
or not. If not, it aborts authentication. Otherwise, it looks up
T ’s ownership references refOn in the database to checks if
mi = hknew
i
(NOn+1 , NT , si) or mi = hkold
i
(NOn+1 , NT , si).
For the former case ki = knewi and for the latter case
ki = k
old
i .
4. If the authentication process succeeds On gives On+1 the
following information via a secure channel:
refV = (A,B,C) = (t, hx(t), Aαnv ) (5)
refOn = (kold, knew, δ, ψ) = (ki, ki+1, t, h
x(t)) (6)
The new owner On+1 check the validity of the provided
information by (3).
Now, the new owner can verify whether the issuer of the tag
T is I by checking whether the following equations hold:
e(h(A), pkI) = e(B, g2) (7)
e(C, g2) = e(Av, g
αn
2 ) (8)
e(vi, g2)
rv = e(B, g2)
rve(C, gαn2 ) (9)
5. If the verification succeeds, On+1 chooses a new random
number ri+1 and computes:
si+1 = (ui, vi) = (g
ri+1
1 , h
x(t).g
α2
n
ri+1
1 ) (10)
mi+1 = hki(NT , si+1) (11)
and sends si+1,mi+1 to the tag and updates its database. Now,
T authenticates On+1 by checking the content of mi+1. If the
authentication succeeds T updates its state parameter to si+1
and its symmetric key to the new key ki+1 where,
ki+1 = PRNG(ki, NOn+1) (12)
In order to prevent the current owner from tracing the tag later
in the future, the new owner has to run a mutual authentication
with the tag outside the range of the current owner after the
ownership transfer is complete.
T On+1 On
NOn+1
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NOn+1
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ,si,mi
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
mi,si,NT ,Av
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
refOn ,refV
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
mi+1,si+1
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 1. Ownership transfer in ROTIV
C. Our Attacks
In this attack, we target mainly the ownership privacy in-
cluding current and new owner privacy of the ROTIV protocol.
Correspondingly, the adversary A has been one of the owners
of the tag T at least once. For example, without loss of
generality, we can assume that A = On. Therefore, at a time
instance e.g. i, she has had access to the tags’s information
refOn . We also assume that the adversary is passive and thus
has access only to Execute and Test queries.
According to the attacking scenario described in Section II-D,
the adversary follows the procedure below to trace the tag T
via distinguishing that which of the two test tags, T0 and T1,
are T .
1) A retrieves the static information of the tag T , δ =
t, ψ = hx(t), from the information she has been give at
time i, refOn .
2) A queries Test(j, T0, T1) and obtains (13) and (14).
{NOl , NT0 ,mj ,mj+1, sj , sj+1} (13)
{NO′
l
, NT1 ,m
′
j ,m
′
j+1, s
′
j, s
′
j+1} (14)
which are the messages exchanged between the owner
Ol and tags T0 and T1 respectively.
3) A saves sj = (uj , vj) and s′i = (u′j , v′j).
4) A checks whether (15) or (16) holds,
e(vj , g2) = e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
vj
ψ
), g2
)
(15)
e(v′j , g2) = e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
v′j
ψ
), g2
)
(16)
5) If (15) is correct then A outputs 0 i.e. T = T0, otherwise
she outputs 1 i.e. T = T1.
Note that we can write (15) because according to bilinear
pairing properties of e, we have:
e(vi, g2) = e(h
x(t).gα
2
l
ri , g2)
= e(ψ.gα
2
l
ri , g2)
= e(ψ, g2)e(g
α2
l
ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), gx2 )e(g
α2
l
ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), pkI)e(g
α2
l
ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
vi
ψ
), g2
)
Using the scenario above, any owner in the protocol which
has had the ownership of the tag T is able to trace it. It is
worth mentioning that since the update procedure of state
values s are performed independent of their previous values
(step 5 of ownership transfer), the aforementioned tracing
scenario can be applied both on the state values of the past
and the future. Hence any owner who has accessed to the
static values of a tag is able to trace it at any time in the past
or future by only eavesdropping state parameter of the tag s.
It implies that the ROTIV protocol lacks both previous owner
and new owner privacy properties.
Remark 1. It should be noted that if an adversary A′ has
access to Corrupt query which gives her this privilege
to tamper the tag and access to the tag’s static information
t, hx(t), her state of knowledge about the tag is exactly the
same as that the adversary A in the stated attack. Hence, she
will also be able to exploit (15) to trace T in any time in the
past and future. This implies that the ROTIV protocol lacks
forward and backward privacy as well.
IV. CHEN et al’S PROTOCOL
Chen et al.’s protocol is designed to meet the require-
ments of EPC Class1 Generation2 standard (ISO18000-6C) for
passive RFID tags. According to this standard, RFID tags’s
computation capabilities is restricted to only performing a
16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) and 16-bit Pseudo-
Random Number Generator (PRNG).
The authors have claimed that their scheme ensures both
forward and backward privacy and it also preserves current
and new owner privacy.
There are four entities involved in the protocol, a tag T , current
owner On, new owner On+1 and issuer I which issues a
new issuer identification to be stored into the tags after each
ownership transfer phase.
A. Description
Chen et al.’s ownership transfer protocol consist of three
phases: requiring phase, authentication phase and ownership
transfer phase. In Chen et al.’s protocol, the T stores two
dynamic symmetric keys ki, k∗i and the h(ti) which is the
hash of the issuer identification. In addition to the tag’s
information the owner has the issuer identification ti.
In the ith time instance of requiring phase (Fig.2), the current
owner first signs the tag’s certificate ti and the identification
of the new owner:
SGOn = SignskOk(ti, IDOn+1) (17)
After that, it encrypts this message with the next owner’s
public key to get Ci:
Ci = EpkOn+1 (ti, SGOn) (18)
and transfers the message (IDOk , Ci) to the new owner On+1.
In authentication phase (Fig.3), the current owner first gener-
ates a random number NOn and then computes Ai:
Ai = CRC(ki ⊕NOn) (19)
and sends it with NOn to the tag. Upon receiving these
messages, the tag verifies the content of the message Ai. If the
verification succeeds, the tag generates a new random value
NT , and computes the Xi, Yi and Zi as following.
Xi = CRC(NT ⊕ k
∗
i ) (20)
Yi = k
∗
i ⊕ IDT ⊕Xi ⊕ ki+1 (21)
Zi = CRC(Xi ⊕ ki ⊕ Yi) (22)
Moreover, the tag updates its keys as:
ki+1 = (k
∗
i ⊕ IDT ⊕NT ⊕ Yi) (23)
k∗i+1 = PRNG(k
∗
i ) (24)
and transfers (NT , Yi, Zi) to the current owner. Upon receiv-
ing the message, On checks the content of Xi and Zi. If this
verification succeeds, it obtains ki+1 and updates its values
accordingly.
In the ownership transfer phase (Fig.4), the new owner On+1
uses its own private key to decrypt Ci received in the requiring
phase and obtains SGOk and ti. Then, it uses the On’s public
key pkOn to verify the correction of SGOk . If the signature is
verified successfully, the new owner signs the ID of its own
as well as the current owner’s:
SGOn+1 = SignskOk+1(IDOk , IDOn+1) (25)
And sends the tuple {IDOi , IDOi+1 , SGOi , SGOi+1 , ti} to
the issuer I to issue a new issuer identification for the tag.
The issuer checks the content of this message and if it is
correct, it issues the ti+1 and computes ti+1⊕ki+1 and h(ti+1)
and transmits them to On. Upon receiving this message, On
sends the former message to the new owner and writes the
latter one into the tag’s memory. The new owner can also
obtain the ti+1 by XORing the message received from the
current owner and the new key stored in the memory.
ti+1 = (ti+1 ⊕ ki+1)⊕ ki+1 (26)
On On+1
IDOk ,Ci
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 2. Requiring phase
T On
h(ti), ki, k
∗
i ti, ki, k
∗
i
NOk ,A
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NT ,Yi,Zi
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3. Authentication phase
On+1 On I
{IDOk ,IDOn+1 ,
SGOk ,SGOn+1 ,ti}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
{IDOk ,IDOn+1 ,IDR,
SGOk ,SGOn+1 ,ti}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ti+1⊕ki+1,h(ti+1)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
ti+1⊕ki+1
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 4. Ownership transfer phase
B. Our Attack
The adversary A in our attack is one of the previous owners
of the tag T . Therefore, she has had access to IDT , ki and
k∗i , where the IDT is the static ID of the tag T or the tag’s
electronic product code(EPC) and ki and k∗i are the dynamic
keys of the tag at time instance i when the tag has been in the
possession of A as the owner.
Being given the messages exchanged between two tags T0, T1,
which one of them is the tag T , and another owner Ol at two
consecutive time instance j and j + 1, the adversary follows
the procedure below to distinguish which of the test tags is
the tag T .
1) A retrieves the static identity of the tag T , IDT .
2) A queries Test(j, T0, T1),Test(j + 1, T0, T1)
and obtain
{Aj , NT0 , NOl , Yj , Zj},{Aj+1, N
′
T0
, N ′Ol , Yj+1, Zj+1}
Yj = k
∗
j ⊕ IDT0 ⊕Xj ⊕ kj (27)
Yj+1 = k
∗
j+1 ⊕ IDT0 ⊕Xj+1 ⊕ kj+1 (28)
Zj = CRC(Xj ⊕ kj+1 ⊕ Yj) (29)
Zj+1 = CRC(Xj+1 ⊕ kj ⊕ Yj+1) (30)
From (27), we have:
kj = k
∗
j ⊕ Yj ⊕ IDT0 ⊕Xj (31)
By substituting kj from (31) in (30), we can write:
Zj+1 = CRC(k
∗
j ⊕ IDT0 ⊕Xj ⊕Xj+1 ⊕ Yj ⊕ Yj+1)
(32)
3) Now the adversary A defines the maximum number
of iterations as τ and follows the following steps to
determine whether T0 is the tag T . It should be noted
that the same process can be used to determine whether
T1 is the tag T .
a) c = 1
b) computes:
k∗ = PRNGc(k∗i ) =
PRNG(PRNG(...(k∗i )..))︸ ︷︷ ︸
c times
.
c) computes
Xj = CRC(k
∗ ⊕NT0) ,
Xj+1 = CRC(PRNG(k
∗)⊕N ′T0).
d) computes ∆X = Xj ⊕Xj+1,∆Y = Yj ⊕ Yj+1 .
e) If Zj+1 6= CRC(k∗⊕IDT⊕∆X⊕∆Y ) and c < τ
then c = c+ 1 and go to b
f) Else A outputs 0 i.e. T0 = T and k∗j = k∗.
This attack shows that the current owner of tag T will be able
to trace it at any time in future. Therefore, we can conclude
that Chen et al.’s protocol lacks new owner privacy.
Remark 2. It should be noted that the procedure above will
work when the number of iterations τ is less than the all
possible values for the key k∗j . This implies that if the length
of key k∗j is n, τ << 2n. So, the tracing process will
work efficiently unless the number of passed sessions are
comparable to 2n.
Remark 3. Any adversary of this kind who has already
obtained k∗j from the above procedure is also able to calculate
kj+1 by (23). Then she will be able to extract ti+1 from the
last message of the tag ownership transfer protocol by using
(26). This results in a more dangerous attack in which the
current owner is able to even impersonate the tag for future
interrogations.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the privacy of two ownership
transfer protocols. The investigation included the attacks to
target the forward and backward privacy as well as previous
and new owner privacy properties. Our results showed both
protocols are vulnerable to the attacks where the adversary is
one of the owners in the system.
Any owner in the system as well as any adversary with the
capability of tampering the tag are able to trace the tag in
the previous and future interrogations in the ROTIV protocol.
Therefore, this protocol lacks four stated privacy properties,
forward privacy, backward privacy, previous owner privacy and
new owner privacy.
Chen et al.’s protocol was also shown to be susceptible to the
attacks in which the adversary is one of the previous owners
of the tag and thus not to fulfil the forward privacy and new
owner privacy. This protocol also revealed the whole tag’s
information to any previous owner and makes the adversary
capable of impersonating the tag in further interrogations.
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